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In the pursuit of foreign policy objectives, states adopt different strategies, 
one of which is military strategy. This research has taken a critical appraisal 
of state actors in the international system, and the utility of military power as 
an instrument of foreign policy. The paper asserts as Osgood did, that one of 
the main prerequisite of a credible state actor is to develop the military 
compatibilities and political will, to back its diplomacy by force when 
necessary. For the use of force is considered as the ultimate tool of 
international relations following the Clausewitzian conception of war as the 
continuation of politics by other means. However, as Klaus Knorr rightly 
concluded in his typology, in either case, whether used defensively or 
offensively, military power lends a measure of international freedom of 
action to the state involved (Knorr in Bassey 2005:26). Thus, affirming the 
political theory of war which argues basically that, in a world system of 
competing states, the basis of diplomacy, and of all contractual obligations 
beyond the boundaries of the state rest on the capacity to use (the diplomacy 
of) violence, both to protect the state, and to protect one’s interest in the face 
of opposition from other states. 
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Introduction 
The capacity of states to defend themselves and their evident 
willingness to do so provides the basic framework within 
which the business of international negotiation is carried on 
(Howard cited in Bassey 2005:21-22). 
The above assertion is in tandem with Osgood’s position that military 
strategy occupies a fundamental place in a country’s foreign policy. In the 
pursuit of states foreign policies and to bolster their national goals, statesmen 
of different nations regulatory pursue incompatible objectives in the 
international arena. This conflict of interest varies in many ways. One state 
may have far more important interest at stake than the others and perceived 
greater issues in the conflict episode. The manners in which statesmen pursue 
their goals also vary in some instances, a state may pursue its interest by 
bringing immense resources such as large military forces, allies, or 
embargoes on products crucial to others to the support of the issue it 
perceived to be at stake. 
The issue at stake and the resources the state is able to bring to support its 
interest form the structure of a conflict. 
The issue at stake in a particular conflict of interest, and or the resources 
available for supporting these issues may be such that a state will prefer to 
stand its grounds or if necessary escalate its conflict activity in order to 
secure its interest. In situations where both states and parties to a conflict 
have the same preference, the structure of the conflict is then akin to the 
game theorist’s concept of the prisoner’s dilemma where no party to the 
conflict wants to back down in respect to what it perceived to be the central 
issue. An attempt by one party to challenge the other on this issue, will lead 
to the other party standing its ground. The conflict episode will therefore 
persist and probably escalate. 
An alternative structure exist when a party does not perceive sufficiently 
important interest to be at stake in a conflict or does not have the resources 
suitable for this particular instance and so prefers to acquiesce in the face of 
an adversary who appears willing to escalate the conflict. This acquiescence 
is akin to the ‘chicken game’ theory where a party with a chicken preference 
will give grounds before an adversary who appears to be committed to 
winning its way on the issue field. These conflicts structures are always 
present in the relations between states, thus, an important variable for 
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statesmen in the accurate identification of the structure underlying any 
particular conflict of interest. Inaccurate identification of the structure of 
conflict of the interest could lead to grave consequences because each 
structure calls for a different strategy. Just as statesmen have difficulties 
identifying the structures of a particular conflict, they also have difficulty in 
applying the strategies appropriate for these structures. However, strategy 
merges with the conduct of states activities abroad implying foreign policy. 
Foreign policy implies the instrument upon which the interest generated by 
the national goals of the state are protected and advanced. The strategies for 
attaining these goals are said to be the core determinants of foreign policy. A 
country’s foreign policy is a set of political goals that seeks to outline how 
that particular country will interact with other countries of the world. It is a 
complex and dynamic cause of action that a nation follows in 
relation to other states policies on specific issues as well as 
commitments to certain positions on the current forms of 
interest and objectives … in international relations and the 
means and methods by which it pursues them (the Brookings 
institution 1975, 375, cited in Eminue, 2006). 
As such foreign policies are generally designed to help protect a country’s 
national interest, national security, ideological goals, and economic 
prosperity. This can occur through peaceful cooperation with other states, 
aggression, war and or exploitation (Wikipedia, cited in Haukkala 2006). The 
means and methods open to states may include strategic planning which 
implies states decisions to employ armed forces impressively in their pursuit 
of national goals by exerting influence and making covert inputs on the 
output of other states policies. 
Military Strategy as an Instrument of Bargaining 
… Whether conceived in terms of its direct or indirect 
employment, military power has become in the modern era, 
the legally  sanctioned instrument of violent which states use 
in their relations with each other and when necessary in an 
international security  role (Bassey 2005:24). 
When diplomacy breaks down or seems to promise little, states today, as in 
the past, at times resort to the use of armed forces in their relations as a 
strategy to enforce their interest. Force can be used to seize objectives or to 
apply sufficient pressure to persuade an adversary to negotiate. Hostilities 
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may continue while the war is on in order to induce concessions and adopt 
acceptable terms of settlement. Thus, cost benefit analysis or rational 
calculations underline decisions and that war is a deliberate, conscious policy 
designed to achieve political goals. State men pursue goals and strategies 
meant to acquire a slice of territory, complex, as in trying to remake an 
enemy’s entire political system or to alter the world balance of power. War 
could be based on simple or limited objectives and confined to 
geographically narrow limits. These are easier to resolve or win than wars 
that involve complex goals, many regions or many participants. For instance, 
Adolph Hitler carried out a systematic plan to conquer Western Europe, and 
therefore strategically was rational, although his ultimate goals; world 
domination and selective genocide, were diabolical and demented 
(Bonchucks 2002). 
Some statesmen calculate the expected utility before employing military 
strategy. These may consist of the values or priorities the nation attaches to 
outcomes that might stem from a war, or the willingness of the nation to take 
risks, and an estimate of key possibilities such as the possibility of winning 
an armed struggle against one or opponents, the probabilities of receiving 
assistance from other actors, and the probabilities of encountering opposition 
from state and non- states actors. War is therefore a planned strategy for 
political goals. Thus when emotions become involved in international 
violence, Freud argued. They inevitably give way to unlimited and 
unreasonable applications of force. Freud believes that humans have a life 
and dead instinct and culture should be shaped to control destructive 
impulses (Freud, 1953). Human instinct to violence, complex emotions of 
fear, frustration, and anger arising from crisis moments, a high degree of 
threat, finite time frame as in hijacking, involvement of the highest foreign 
policy establishment in the decision process during a crisis situation, are all 
war potentials. 
Since 1945, there has been the paucity of war involvement by countries 
considered to be major powers and, in particular, the absence of war 
involvement between major powers themselves; in spite of the crisis and 
confrontations in which the USA and the USSR supported their allies, e.g. 
Korea, Vietnam, Angola, etc, they did not fight each other in a war. In many 
instances, force has been used more as a political instrument or as raw 
military instrument. This is coercive diplomacy or diplomacy of violence, 
e.g- Israeli strategy of harsh reprisals against Arab states hosting Palestinian 
raiders or civil war between states which are legion (Bonchuks 2002). 
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Leaders weigh options and make decision based primarily on their strategic 
situation and an assessment of relative power. State autonomy vis-à-vis 
society, organizational politics, and civil-military relations can hinder the 
efficiency of statesmen responses to systemic imperatives. For instance, state 
capability, implying the extractive capacity of a state’s central political 
institution, influences both the amount of military power a state can project in 
its foreign policy and the scope of its grand strategy (Desch 1996: 237-268). 
The gross distribution of power and the relative share of the international 
system’s material capabilities that each state controls affect the capabilities 
that individual states carry out particular diplomatic and military strategies. 
This is turn influence the severity of the security dilemma between particular 
states or regional subsystems.  
The possession of particular military technologies and weapons’ systems 
influences the relative state with which a state can support its foreign policy 
and or threaten, or attack another in the pursuit of foreign policy. Military 
strategy may not necessarily be applied against the greatest threat in the 
international system but against states that pose an immediate threat to their 
foreign policies or survival (Waltz 1987:21-34 and 262-285). Waltz further 
holds that the needs for survival often force states to forgo mutual beneficial 
cooperation. Cooperation becomes difficult because states are sensitive to 
how it affects their current and future relative capabilities.  
In the views of Mearsheimer, states must constantly worry about their 
survival because potential competitors may try to eliminate them at any time. 
He argued that “states operate in both international political environment and 
international economic environment, and the former dominates the latter in 
cases where the two come into conflict” (Mearsheimer 1992: 213-237). 
This implies that stats will heavily rely on military strategy and exert their 
capacity for armed coercion to support their foreign policies.                                                                     
Thomas Christensen’s domestic mobilization theory addresses the problem of 
how domestic politics constraints states’ abilities to adjust their foreign 
policies (Christensen 1996: 256). In the late 1940s and 1950s the U.S and 
Chinese leaders fought to mobilize domestic resources to balance against the 
then USSR, but lacked sufficient national political power to do so as they 
pleased. President Harry Truman and Mao Zedong used domestically popular 
but unnecessary foreign policies in secondary areas as a diversion for 
necessary, but unpopular policies in primary areas. These secondary policies 
set in motion a chain of events culminating in the U.S subsequent Chinese 
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interventions in the Korean war and the 1959 Quemoy - matsu crisis (1996; 
32-72, 194-241).  
Considering the grand strategies of the superpowers during the cold war, 
Freiberg agues that while the capacity for armed coercion push the U.S and 
the then USSR toward confrontation in pursuit of their foreign policies, 
internal factors shaped the types of strategies each side adopted. In the case 
of the U.S, a combination of weak states institutions, the material interests of 
various societal actors, and embedded antistatic ideology eventually led to 
the pursuit of a flexible response strategy and a limited program of power 
creation. The former USSR on the other had lacked all of the countervailing 
domestic influences. As a result, during most of the cold war, the USSR 
pursued a more ambitious military doctrine, full war fighting, than the U.S 
and undertook a far expansive program of power creation (Friedberg 2000: 
66 and 75). 
The central theme running throughout this paper is that for any state to 
become an effective and credible international actor, able to shape its 
immediate environment and contribute to global peace and security, it must 
develop the military capabilities and political will to backup its foreign policy 
by force when necessary. Advocates of civilian power without armed 
coercion have argued that security today even for the super powers; consist in 
shaping the international milieu often in areas which at first sight have little 
to do with security. 
Citing the case of Western Europe, Duchene wrote that Europe would be the 
first major areas of the old world where the age old process of war and direct 
violence could be translated into something more in tune with the twentieth 
century citizen’s notion of civilized politics where its relative lack of military 
compatibilities would not be a problem (Duchene 1972; 43 -44). The civilian 
power concept was subsequently developed by Hans Maul and applied to 
West Germany and Japan (Maul 1990, 2000) Maul drew heavily on Nye’s 
concepts of soft (or persuasive) power (Nye 1990), arguing that civilian 
power was committed to multilateral co-operation, institution - building and 
supranational integration rather than national pride, unilateralism and the 
unbridled defense of sovereignty. 
They sought to ‘civilianized’ international relations by constraining the use 
of military force and strengthening the rule of law, the peaceful resolve of 
disputes and human rights. The concept of civilian power has been widely 
applied to the EU/ the EC as international actors (Hill 1990). These 
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arguments all reflect an influential line of reasoning rooted as Hedley Bull 
(1981) noted in the idealist and progressivist interpretations of international 
relations of the 1920s. For Bull, the views of Duchene, Nye, Keohane, and 
others, who emphasized factors such as the declining utility of military forces 
as a currency of power, the vitality of civilian power, the inadequacies of the 
state-centric paradigm and the power ideals, constituted the neo-progressive 
or the neo idealist approach of the 1970s. The approach has enjoyed a 
renewed lease of life with the end of the cold war. 
The problem with the civilian power concept is that it ignores the strategic 
and geo-political context within which the European integration process 
developed. At the time Duchene wrote, Western Europe was locked into a 
bipolar confrontation with the USSR and its allies, and relied on NATO and 
the U.S nuclear and conventional forces for its security. France and the UK 
also possessed their own nuclear weapons, and most Western Europe 
countries based their defense around man conscript armies. What was then 
still call the EEC could only be a civilian power because of NATO and the 
US security guarantee. Bluntly speaking, the EC was a classic case of a free 
rider benefiting from security provided by others. As noted by Bull, the 
civilian power concept was a contradiction in terms because the power of 
influence exerted by EC and other such civilian actors was conditional upon 
a strategic environment provided by the military power of states, which they 
did not control. Europe, he concluded is not an actor in international affairs 
and does not seem likely to become one (Bull 1981: 151).  
In the early 1970s, claims that inter dependence had led to low politics 
replacing military concerns at the top of the international agenda underpinned 
arguments that the militarily weak and politically disunited countries of 
Western Europe constituted a great civilian power. The hollowness of this 
claim was apparent from their behaviour after the 1973-74 oil crises. Not 
Western as any kind of power, but the separate states of Western Europe, 
responded to the crisis by behaving at once like Hens and Ostriches (Waltz 
1979:152). 
However, in recent years, the EU has developed in ways that cast doubt on 
the explanatory utility of self power’ based theories such as civilian and 
normative power. Such theories have become increasingly marginal to the 
current debate on security and defense cooperation. It is beginning to emerge 
as a strategic actor in its own right with both hard and soft power capabilities 
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and is also acquiring the status of an actor in the sense of the ability not just 
to define its strategic interest, but to pursue them in policy initiative. 
Structural realism would also suggest that whatever its original features may 
be, the pressure of the international system will lead it over time to acquire 
the attributes and capabilities of other states actors, in particular, a capacity 
for exercising coercive military power. Since the theory depicts international 
politics as a competitive system, Waltz argues, one predicts more specifically 
that states will display characteristics common to competitors. (1979:128) 
such as utilizing the capacity for armed coercion in the pursuit of their 
foreign policies. 
Coercive Diplomacy and Foreign Policy 
Brute force succeeds when it is used, whereas the power to 
hurt is most successful when held in reserve. It is the threat 
of damage, or of more damage to come, that can make 
someone yield or comply… (Schelling,1966:3). 
Coercion entails using what Schelling termed the ‘diplomacy of violence’ to 
influence the cost- benefit calculations of the adversary. In coercive 
strategies, diplomacy is backed up by just enough force of an appropriate 
kind to demonstrate resolution and to give credibility to the threat that greater 
force will be used if necessary’ (George in Freedman, 1998: 20). The aim is 
to convince the target state of one’s political resolve and military capabilities. 
Even in deterrence strategy, important signaling, bargaining, and negotiating 
dimensions are built into the strategy of coercive diplomacy. Coercion 
involves the use of threat of force, or the limited use of force with the threat 
of further escalation, to change the decision making calculus of the target 
actor. Strategy, Hedley Bull argued, is the art or science of shaping means so 
as to promote ends in any given field of conduct’ and involves ‘ exploiting 
military force so as to attain given objects of policy’. In any conflict 
situation, the strategic aim is to break the enemy’s will to resist. There are 
many ways in which this can be achieved, but the classic distinction is that 
drawn by Thomas Schelling  between what he termed ‘brute force’ and 
‘coercion’ Brute force involves using military power in an all-out assault to 
destroy the target’s military assets in order to remove his power to resist and 
impose one’s will upon him. Coercion, on the other hand, involves the threat 
of force and, if that is insufficient, the actual use of limited force with the 
threat of more to come. The crucial point to note is that with coercion, in 
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contrast to strategies employing brute force, the target retains an element of 
free choice. 
The distinguishing feature of coercion, as Lawrence Freedman points out, is 
that, the target is never denied choice, but must weight the choices between 
the cost of compliance and of non-compliance (1998:36). The perfection of 
strategy, offers the prospect of achieving foreign policy goals without serious 
fighting or undue cost in blood or coin, yet coercive strategies are notoriously 
difficult to devise and implement, and the historical records is not 
particularly promising. 
Four problems in particular stand out: Coercion involves a spectrum of 
military force from threats to the actual use of force. It can be seen as a form 
of “limited war”, particularly in its emphasis on politics, diplomacy and 
psychological factors (Kissinger 1957). 
The problem here is that military force is a notoriously blunt instrument, 
which is more like a sledgehammer than a scalpel. Using force discriminately 
and effectively is difficult, military strategy in crisis management situations 
must be framed with a view not just to winning the contest, but building a 
post-conflict peace order. At the same time, the requirement for political 
direction and control of the conflict must not lead to micro-management of 
the battlefield: a balance must be found between political accountability and 
military effectiveness. 
Coercive strategies seek to change the decision-making calculus of the 
adversary, not to establish control via a decisive military victory and the 
defeat of the enemy. The target always retains an element of choice. Such a 
strategy assumes that interests are not zero-sum and incommensurate, but that 
there is some shared ground, and that compromise is possible. In a sense 
therefore, it assumes some underling agreement about the nature of the 
conflict, which might not be the case with rogue states or warlords in a failed 
state.  
Framing a coercive strategy is also difficult because one must consider both 
the balance of interests involved and the strength of motivation, in other 
words, not just what interests each side has, but how strongly they feel about 
them. It thus involves understanding the identity and fundamental value of 
the two adversaries; how they construct and interpret reality; and the 
“bounded rationality” within which they operate. Moreover, interests can 
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change in the course of a conflict as positions harden and negotiating 
positions become less flexible. 
    The key to the successful use of strategic coercion is to identify the 
appropriate “coercive mechanisms” i. e the vulnerabilities and pressure 
points of the adversary. Once the target’s center of gravity has been 
identified, force can be used discriminately and effectively. 
This is the crux of the problem, but accurately identifying the coercive 
mechanism, is extremely difficult, as the example of the Kosovo campaign 
illustrates. At the end of the day, coercion is not a science and certainly does 
not involve the application of mechanical formula and rational calculation. 
Rather, it is an art, involving the creative use of resources and skilful 
bargaining-what Clausewitz regarded as creativity and genius.   
Coercion, to paraphrase Clausewitz, is the continuation of politics by other 
means; it involves using the skills and instruments of diplomacy and 
combining them with the threat of force. The problems here are manifold. It 
is difficult to combine carrots and sticks because of the mixed signals this can 
send: carrots can suggest a lack of resolve and a propensity for appeasement, 
while sticks can imply that the coercer has more far-reaching and aggressive 
intentions 
Coercion also involves complex games played at two or more levels: coercers 
need to convince domestic public opinion of the justness and urgency of their 
cause, they must build and maintain consensus at the international level 
between allies, and they must communicate clear messages to the adversary. 
Coercive strategies are often implemented in multi-actor environments, 
above all, crisis management involving coercive diplomacy; like all strategic 
interaction, proceeds with a non-linear, paradoxical logic, unlike domestic 
conflicts which are constrained and patterned by law and custom. Escalation 
is an ever present risk, and thus as Hill (1990:143) notes, coercive diplomacy 
involves a gamble on big returns and big loses. 
Impact of Military Strategy 
The power to hurt can be counted among the most impressive 
attributes of military force. Hurting… is not unconcerned with 
the interest of others. It is measured in the suffering it can 
cause, and the victims’ motivation to void it. Forcible action 
will work against weeds or floods as well as against armies but 
suffering requires a victim that can feel pain or has something 
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to loss… it can only make people behave to avoid it. The only 
purpose… must be to influence somebody’s behavior, to coerce 
his decision or choice. To be coercive, violence has to be 
anticipated and (only) avoidable by accommodation. The power 
to hurt is bargaining power. To exploit it, is diplomacy- vicious 
diplomacy, but diplomacy ( schelling, 1966:2) 
In the strategic domain, and in the contemporary international order, the 
power of war and the capacity for armed coercion which it sustains play a 
veritable role in international politics. Consequently it has become a standard 
to refer to military power as one of the various techniques of statesmanship 
alongside diplomacy, economic sanctions, propaganda and subversion. 
Drawing from the EUS aspiration as a regional hegemon, it has pursued 
milieu goals with the aim of reshaping European order in ways advantageous 
to the security and prosperity of its members. It has done so by wielding a 
mix of hard and soft power. Its hard power resources have primarily been 
based on economic carrots and stick. Linked to politically determined 
conditionality clauses. The not- inconsiderable instruments of economic 
statecraft available have provided a set of coercive instruments, which 
constitute the mailed first within the velvet glove of diplomacy. In the 
immediate wake of the end of the cold war, there was a widespread feeling 
that the pattern of the international relations has changed and that military 
coercion has been significantly devalued as a currency of power. Such 
sentiments fuelled the revival of the neo-idealist and neo-progressivist 
fashion identified earlier by Bull, and led some policy makers to conclude 
that soft power supported by the skillful exercise of economic statecraft 
would suffice for justice and liberty to triumph. It was illusion such as these 
in the efficacy of civilian power that led to the tragedy of the Balkans. In 
1990, the foreign minister of Luxemburg and then acting president of the EU 
council- Jacques Poos, grandly announced-‘this is the hour of Europe, not the 
hour of the Americans…if one problem can be solved by the Europeans, it’s 
the Yugoslav problem. This is a European country and it is not up to the 
Americans and not up to anybody else.’ (Quoted in White, 2001:108).This 
was however followed by force, and then by tragedy as ‘Europe’ in  the 
shape of the EU failed to stop the descent into violence and ethnic cleansing 
in the Balkans. In the end, it was hard-nosed U.S. diplomacy, NATO bombs 
and Anglo - French military action that brought an end to the cycle of 
bloodshed in Bosnia and later Kosovo. The wars of Yugoslav succession 
demonstrated all too starkly the limits of civilian power. The major lesson of 
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the Balkans was that if the EU wanted to be credible and effective 
international actor, it needed to be able to backup its diplomacy with military 
coercion.   
…Perhaps the classical and in many ways the most celebrated 
definitive statement of this interplay between the military 
instrument and policy objective is incisively represented in the 
Clausewitzian aphorism that ‘war is nothing than a 
continuation of politics by an admixture of other means: In 
order words from the standpoint of Clausewitz, war is a 
purposive, functional thing which states utilize at an 
appropriate moment in the pursuit of their respective policy 
objectives… (cited in Bassey 1998.6 ) 
Utilizing the capacity for armed coercion (war) to support foreign policy, in 
Clausewitzian’s view is a rational, national instrument of policy. The events 
of the Balkans in the early 1990s, in conjunction with the Iraqi invasions of 
Kuwait and the problems of failed states such as Somalia and Afghanistan, 
demonstrated that although Europe’s heartlands might enjoy a more peaceful 
and benign security environment, the world remained a dangerous and 
threatening place and international peace and security remained threatened by 
a mix of old and new security issues. The lesson from the Balkans, Sierra 
Leone, Rwanda, and Somalia was that diplomacy and moral posturing. - The 
primary instruments of civilian power were on their own rarely effective to 
reverse aggression. The common theme in this failure was the inability of 
governments to back principle with decisive military force. Reflecting on the 
Banlkan wars, Carl Bildt, among others, argued that military force is 
sometimes essential in order to backup diplomatic initiative. Force, he argued 
should never be a substitute for diplomacy but under the right conditions it 
can give strength to the search for political solutions represented by 
diplomacy. The former U.N secretary Kofi Annan argued; in the context of 
their Kosovo war, that there are times when the use of force may be 
legitimate in the pursuit of (foreign policy) peace. By the end of the 1990s, it 
was evident that the EU had learnt the hard way of enduring relevance of 
Machiavelli’s allegory of the centaur, half beast and man. Machiavelli 
believed that the foundation of any political order was good laws and good - 
arms a judicious mix of force and authority, coercion and consent, power and 
hegemony. Indeed, he believed that good arms were inescapable prerequisite 
for good laws and that where there are good arms, good laws inevitably 
follow. Machiavelli therefore believed that political leaders needed to learn 
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both how to act in the context of a stable environment governed by the rule of 
law and settled institutions, and in a situation of anarchy when the laws of the 
jungle applied. 
…you should understand, therefore, that there are two ways of 
fighting: by law or by force. The first way is natural to man, 
and the second to beasts. But as the  first way often proves 
inadequate, one must need have recourse to the second, so the 
Prince must understand how to make a nice use of the beast 
and the man… a Prince must know how to act according to the 
nature of both, as he cannot survive otherwise (Machiavelli: 
1962). 
Conclusion 
…The historical as well as contemporary prevalence of inter 
and intra- national wars and military alliances have sustained 
the view that until the nation state system is radically 
transformed and superseded by a different international order, 
the military power and the capacity for armed coercion which 
it sustains, is likely to continue to play a significant part in 
international politics (Bassey, 2005: 22) 
Strategic thought is never separated from political thought, state must 
recognize that if they are to act as a civilian power, they need to add coercive 
military power to their foreign and security policy instruments. The finish 
armed forces in the world and the most effective crisis decision- making may 
be useless if a state fail to develop a common strategic culture and military 
doctrines. States that intend to become serious players in the international 
system must be decisive on how to use military force in support of foreign 
policy. 
Coercion is a very difficult strategy to implement as it is replete with risks 
and uncertainties. There is an ever present risk of escalation in the context of 
a changing and dynamic environment. Once force or the threat of force is 
introduced into a crisis situation, the whole dynamics of the conflict change. 
States have no option but to try to develop the capacities and political will to 
make nice use of the beast and the man, if they desire to be ethical powers 
that can both  protect their citizens and save strangers, they must be able to 
back up their diplomacy with military force and thus actively shape 
international system. 
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